35 Atl. 825; *"The Count Joannes"* v. *Bennett,* 5 Allen 169; *Fitzgerald* v. *Robinson,* 112 Mass. 371. In general, neither from pulpit nor altar can slander be uttered without justification, even though the purpose is to reform an evildoer. ODGERS, SLANDER & LIBEL (1st Amer Ed.) p. 242; *Magrath* v. *Finn,* Ir. R. 11 C. L. 152. For not only must the occasion be privileged, but the interest or duty must be co-existent with the communication, NEWELL, DEFAMATION, p. 477; the defamatory matter must not exceed the exigency of the occasion. *Hines* v. *Shumaker,* 97 Miss, 669, 52 South 705; and even where there is a community of interest, the privilege is lost when the words are conveyed to too large a number. NEWELL, DEFAMATION, p. 529. Qualified privilege and fair comment often are discussed interchangeably. In truth, no identity exists and the distinction is clear. *Plymouth Society* v. *Traders' Pub. Co.,* [1906] 1 K. B. 403; *Burt* v. *Advertiser Newspaper Co.,* 154 Mass 238, 242, 28 N.E. 1, 13 L. R. A. 97. Privilege attaches to the occasion and the communicant, comment and criticism to the public character of the person or thing defamed. See 10 MICH L. REV. 351.

MASTER AND SERVANT—HOURS OF LABOR FOR WOMEN—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.—Mass. Statutes 1909, Chap. 514, § 48, limiting the time during which women may be employed at labor in manufacturing and mechanical establishments to 56 hours a week and to 10 hours in each day, (with some exceptions), and providing that every employer shall post in a conspicuous place in every room where such persons are employed a printed notice stating the number of hours of work required of them in each day of the week, the hours of commencing and stopping work, and the hours when the time for meals begins and ends, etc., *Held,* constitutional. *Commonwealth* v. *Riley,* (Mass. 1912), 97 N. E. 367.

The court follows its decision rendered in 1876 upholding the constitutionality of a statute restricting the hours of employment of women and children in a single manufacturing service. *Com.* v. *Hamilton, Woolen Co.,* 120 Mass. 383. Similar acts have been recently upheld in the following cases: *Muller* v. *Oregon,* 208 U. S. 412. 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551, affirming *State* v. *Muller,* 48 Or. 252, 85 Pac. 855, 120 Am. St. Rep. 805; *Wenham* v. *State,* 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W. 421, 58 L. R. A. 825; *State* v. *Buchanan,* 29 Wash. 602, 70 Pac. 52, 59 L. R. A. 342, 92 Am. St. Rep. 930; *Com* v. *Beatty,* 15 Pa. Super. Ct. 5, 17; *Withey* v. *Bloom,* 163 Mich. 419, 128 N.W. 913; *Ritchie* v. *Wayman,* 244 Ill. 509, 91 N.E. 695, 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 994; *People* v. *Bowes-Allegretti Co.,* 244 Ill. 557, 91 N. E. 701. There are a few cases to the contrary but they seem to have been decided according to peculiar constitutional provisions of those States. *Burcher* v. *People,* 41 Colo. 495, 93 Pac. 14, 124 Am. St. Rep. 143; *Matter of Mary McGuire,* 57 Cal. 604, 40 Am. Rep. 125. The act does not apply to men so it is not within the principle of *Lochner* v. *New York,* 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937; and *Opinion of the Justices,* 208 Mass. 622, 94 N.E. 1044. A classification of women and children as to employment, confined to manufacturing and mechanical establishments is a reasonable one and a legitimate exercise of legislative power. *Com* v. *Hamilton,* 120 Mass. 383; *Griffith* v. *Connecticut,* 218 U. S. 563, 31 Sup. Ct. 132, 54 L. Ed. 1151.